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Abstract  
We study residential demand for electricity and gas, working with nationwide household-level 
data that cover recent years, namely 1997-2007. Our dataset is a mixed panel/multi-year cross-
sections of dwellings/households in the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the United States as of 
2008. To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive set of data for examining household 
residential energy usage at the national level, containing the broadest geographical coverage, 
and with the longest longitudinal component (up to 6 observations per dwelling).  
 
We estimate static and dynamic models of electricity and gas demand. We find strong 
household response to energy prices, both in the short and long term. From the static models, we 
get estimates of the own price elasticity of electricity demand in the -0.860 to -0.667 range, 
while the own price elasticity of gas demand is -0.693 to -0.566. These results are robust to a 
variety of checks. Contrary to earlier literature (Metcalf and Hassett, 1999; Reiss and White, 
2005), we find no evidence of significantly different elasticities across households with electric 
and gas heat. The price elasticity of electricity demand declines with income, but the magnitude 
of this effect is small.  
 
These results are in sharp contrast to much of the literature on residential energy consumption in 
the United States, and with the figures used in current government agency practice. Our results 
suggest that there might be greater potential for policies which affect energy price than may 
have been previously appreciated.  
 
 
JEL Classification: D, D2, Q4, Q41, Q48. 
Keywords: residential electricity and gas demand; price elasticity of energy demand; static 
model; dynamic panel data model; partial adjustment model. 
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Residential Consumption of Gas and Electricity in the U.S.:  
The Role of Prices and Income  
 
1. Introduction 
In the United States and in other developed countries, buildings account for over 40% of 
total annual energy use.  Despite many recent policies that either mandate or promote energy 
efficiency among residential energy users,
1
Recently, there has been considerable debate in academic and policy circles as to 
whether retail energy prices, including those charged to the residential sector, will increase or 
decrease as a result of deregulation (Fabrizio et al., 2007, Showalter, 2007a,b, Carlson and 
Loomis, 2008),  establishment of emissions trading markets (e.g., Frondel et al., 2008, Burtraw 
et al., 2002, Smale et al., 2006), and imposition of renewable portfolio standards, which is 
usually done at the state level (Fischer 2010).  More stringent environmental regulations on 
emissions and pollutants from power plants (e.g., nitrogen and sulfur oxides, and mercury) and 
tightened ambient air quality standards are also expected to increase cost of energy to 
consumers.
 U.S. residential energy demand has grown over the 
last three decades, and projections suggest that it will continue to do so for the foreseeable 
future (EIA, 2010).  
2
                                                 
1 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the Stimulus Bill) of 2009, for instance, allocated some $27.2 
Billion for energy efficiency and renewable energy R&D. Yet, despite many cost-effective opportunities for energy 
efficiency improvement, projects often go unpursued. In principle, were homeowners aware of the future energy 
savings, they would spontaneously undertake energy efficiency investments in their homes. In practice, consumers 
and homeowners have often been observed to pass up opportunities to  make energy-efficiency  investments.  
Possible explanations for the so-called “energy paradox” (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994) include liquidity constraints, 
limited information, uncertainty about future energy prices (Hassett and Metcalf, 1993), high rates of intertemporal 
preferences, disbelief in engineering estimates of the cost savings themselves (Metcalf and Hassett, 1999), and 
institutional disincentives (see Golove and Eto, 1996).  
  
2 Financing costs from investments to electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure, volatility and rising 
scarcity in feedstocks such as coal, propane, natural gas, and petroleum, and the establishment of a price on carbon, 
are all possible mechanisms which would increase the price of energy [Basheda et al. (2006)].  3 
 
                                                
For the purpose of forecasting demand and planning for generation, transmission and 
distribution capacity, and for energy policy purposes, it is important to measure the 
responsiveness of residential energy demand to the prices of electricity and gas, the two major 
sources of residential energy in the U.S.  Earlier research has examined household demand for 
energy and its responsiveness to price, but these analyses i) used old data  (Quigley and 
Rubinfeld, 1989, Metcalf and Hassett, 1999), ii) are restricted to limited geographical areas 
(e.g., Garcia-Cerrutti, 2000; Reiss and Weiss, 2005), so that it is difficult to extrapolate their 
results to other areas with different climates, housing stock and electricity suppliers, or iii) were 
based on cross-sections or extremely short panels of data (with a maximum of two observations 
per household) (e.g., Metcalf and Hassett, 1999), and did not fully address issues of unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity.  In some cases, responsiveness to price was inferred from supply 
shocks so severe and geographically circumscribed (e.g., Bushnell and Mansur, 2005; Reiss and 
White, 2008) as to render them inapplicable for broader areas and more gradual price changes.  
For these reasons, in this paper we wish to ask three research questions. First, what are 
the (nationwide) price elasticities of residential electricity and gas demand? Second, is such 
responsiveness sensitive to equipment and energy choices that are not easily reversed (e.g., 
using gas or electricity for heating or cooling)? Third, how does household income influence 
demand and the price elasticities? 
To answer our research questions we have assembled a large and comprehensive dataset 
that documents energy usage data for over 69,000 dwellings (74,000 households) in the United 
States. Specifically, we have household utility bills as reported in six nationwide waves of the 
American Housing Survey (AHS: 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007) plus three metro-4 
 
                                                
area waves of the same survey (2002, 2004 and 2007).
3
Attention is focused to single-family homes and duplexes, and to electricity and gas 
consumption.  We merge these data with electric and gas utility company data (including price 
and demand-side management policies), and climate data. Since the dataset has a longer 
longitudinal component than any previous nationwide household-level study on these issues, we 
are able to control for aspects of, and any changes in, the household, the housing unit, and the 
energy prices faced by that household. We estimate static and dynamic models, with and 
without controls for the current stock of appliances.  
 Our dataset is a panel that follows 
dwellings (not households) in the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. as of 2008 (54 cities) 
in the even years of this decade, augmented with cross-sectional observations from the metro 
surveys (2002, 2004 and 2007). The AHS contains extensive information about the structural 
characteristics of the dwelling, renovations and retrofits, utility bills, fuels used, appliances and 
heating/cooling systems, and socio-demographic and economic circumstances of the occupants.  
One important feature of our work is that we can control for unobserved heterogeneity in 
a number of different ways. We use dwelling-specific fixed effects (a natural candidate given 
the sampling frame of the AHS), but we also experiment with dwelling-household fixed effects, 
and city-specific fixed effects. The latter give us a good sense of how electricity and gas usage 
vary with the size and age of the home, and with income (for which there is wide variation 
across homes, but not much at all within homes or households).  
Briefly, we find that electricity use is responsive to the price of electricity (with an 
elasticity that ranges from -0.67 to -0.86) and increases with the price of gas, indicating that the 
latter is a substitute for electricity. The demand for gas is only slightly less responsive, with 
                                                 
3 Quigley and Rubinfeld (1989) used AHS to estimate their hedonic model of residential energy demand, but use 
only the 1980 survey year. 5 
 
                                                
own-price elasticities ranging from -0.565 to -0.693. The elasticities are highest in the models 
with city-specific effects, and lowest in the models with dwelling-specific effects, but stay 
within a limited range. (Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity reduces the elasticities by 
15% to 32% relative to a model that does not include any effects at all, where the own price 
elasticity of electricity demand is -1.) 
The price elasticities are stable across specifications, and similar for homes with electric 
and gas heat. Our checks suggest that the effect of mismeasuring energy prices is small. The 
price elasticities are slightly higher among the poorest households (those that fall in the bottom 
25% of the distribution of household income in our sample), and decline monotonically with 
income, but in practice this effect is not important.  Our dynamic models produce short-run 
own-price elasticities equal to -0.736 and -0.572 for electricity and gas, respectively. Their long-
run counterparts are -0.814 and -0.647,  respectively.  These figures are virtually unchanged 
whether or not we control for difficult-to-reverse choices of heating/cooling technologies.  
In sum, we exploit a nationwide sample with unprecedented detail and breadth of 
coverage to study residential energy consumption in the United States since 1997. In contrast to 
previous studies, we find strong responsiveness to energy prices, both in the short and long 
term, and across homes with electric or gas heating, or air conditioning. These findings are 
robust to state, city, dwelling, and dwelling-family fixed effects, and different price formulations 
employed to correct for measurement error.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We offer a brief literature review in 
section 2. We describe the models and econometric issues in Section 3 and the data in Section 4. 
Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
 6 
 
                                                
2. Previous Literature  
A. Response of Energy Use to Price  
Knowing the responsiveness of energy demand to the price allows analysts to predict the 
effects of price changes or policies that result in price changes—for example, taxes on carbon 
emissions, or mandates on the share of renewable energy. Earlier research has produced a wide 
range of estimates of the price elasticity of demand in the residential sector, possibly because of 
the diverse types of data used (time- series, cross-sections and panel), level of geographical and 
jurisdictional aggregation (local, state, or national), extent of the observed variation in price, and 
time periods covered.  
  Dergiades and Tsoulfidis (2008) use annual data for the U.S. from 1965 to 2006, and 
estimate the short- (long-) run own-price elasticity of residential electricity consumption to be -
0.386 (-1.06). Coefficients are assumed to be constant across locales and over the study period, 
despite a time span of 41 years. Using a similar time series to study average consumer behavior, 
Kamerschen and Porter (2004) employ  a simultaneous equations approach with aggregate 
annual U.S. energy data from 1973 to 1998, and obtain likewise high elasticities that range from 
-0.94 to -0.85. 
Bernstein and Griffin (2005) use a panel of state-level data covering 1997-2004, and 
estimate that during that period the short-run  (long-run)  own-price elasticity of electricity 
demand is -0.243 (-0.32). They conclude that these elasticities are similar to the ones estimated 
in studies 20 years earlier. Paul et al. (2008) use monthly price and electricity demand data at 
the state level for 1990-2006, but allow for the price elasticity of demand to vary across regions. 
They find, after averaging across locales, that the own price elasticity is -0.13 in the short run 
and -0.36 in the long run, and conclude that the demand is inelastic. Alberini and Filippini 7 
 
                                                
(2010) likewise focus on annual state-level data in the U.S. from 1995 to 2007, but attempt to 
get consistent estimates of the long-run elasticity by using a bias correct “within” estimator 
(Kiviet, 1995) and the Blundell-Bond (1998) approach. The short-run own price elasticities of 
electricity range from -0.15 to -0.08, and their long-run counterparts range from -0.78 to -0.44. 
Hsing (1994) estimates the own-price elasticity of electricity demand in five Southern 
states to be -0.24 in the short run and -0.54 in the long run. Garcia-Cerutti (2000) uses county-
level data from 44 California counties for 1983-1997 and random-coefficient models to examine 
both electricity and gas demand. The own-price elasticity of electricity demand is -0.17 in the 
short run and -0.19 in the long run, with significant variation between counties. Natural gas is 
concluded to be a complement of, rather than a substitute to, electricity. 
Studies that have focused on household-level data have likewise found a wide range of 
price elasticities. Quigley and Rubinfeld (1989) use a cross-section from the 1980 American 
Housing Survey and unit price data from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, and find evidence 
of low elasticity of energy demand (-0.1 in the short run).  Metcalf and Hassett (1999) use the 
1984, 1987 and 1990 waves of the Department of Energy’s Residential Energy Consumption 
Survey to examine insulation investments by homeowners, and find  price elasticities  of 
electricity ranging from -0.73 to -1.16 for that households that use electricity for space heating, 
whereas those who use gas for space heating are not sensitive to the price of electricity.  
  Bernard  et al.  (2010) have multi-year cross-section data about electricity and gas 
consumption and prices in Quebec from 1989-2002, and their analysis is based on constructing 
pseudo-panels, i.e., relatively similar groups for which the relevant variables are the group 8 
 
                                                
averages.
4  Reasons for focusing on Quebec households include the facts that electricity is 
inexpensive and in large supply, and households rely heavily on electric heat, despite the 
extremely cold climate. Bernard et al. estimate the short-run and long-run elasticity to be -0.51 
and -1.32, respectively, and conclude that electricity and natural gas are substitutes.
5
  One concern when examining the responsiveness of electricity use with respect to price 
is that the data contain sufficient price variation. Such variation is usually attained by selecting 
a broad geographic area and/or a sufficient long period of time. In some cases, identification is 
made possible by abrupt changes in prices due to supply conditions. Reiss and White (2008) 
and Bushnell and Mansur (2005) exploit the energy crisis and rapidly growing electricity rates 
in California in 2000 and 2001, and document relatively large reductions in energy usage 
induced by such price increases.   
  
   Attention has also been paid to the possible heterogeneity in the response to electricity 
rates across households, depending on age, race and ethnicity.  Poyer and Williams (1993) 
examine whether electricity demand is different for different ethnicities and races, and find that 
while the demand is inelastic for all groups, blacks appear to be more sensitive to short-run 
price variations than Hispanics and whites. Based on discrete/continuous models of appliance 
choice and energy use, Liao and Chang (2002) find that the elderly require more natural gas and 
                                                 
4 The groups are the 27 potential cohorts obtained by forming all of the possible combinations of the 9 
administrative regions and 3 house size classes. Two cohorts were collapsed together with others because of too 
few observations.  
5 Studies outside of North America tend to be produce price elasticity ranges similar to those for North America. 
Nesbakken (1999) focuses on the choice of heating and residential energy consumption in Norway, reporting that 
short- and long-term price elasticities (in the range of -0.33 to -0.66) are remarkably stable across the 1990-1995 
period, with the only exception of 1993. In contrast to other papers, responsiveness to price is more pronounced at 
higher levels of income. Meier and Rehdanz (2010) use a 15-year panel of residential heating expenditures in 
Great Britain. Using a log-linear specification with year and regional effects, they obtain gas price elasticities 
between -0.4 and -0.49,  which fall in the range of -0.2 to -0.57 from the comparable literature. They obtain 
different elasticities for  homeowners and renters. Leth-Petersen and Togeby (2001) find  much lower price 





                                                
fuel oil but less electricity, the demand for space heating increases as the elderly get older, and 
the demand for energy for heating water decreases with age.  
 
B. Which Price? 
Standard economic theory posits that what matters in the household’s energy demand is 
marginal price. If price is constant with respect to quantity and there is no fixed fee, the 
marginal price is constant and equal to the average price. In practice, this is seldom the case. For 
starters, many utilities charge a fixed fee in each billing period on top of the metered amount, 
which makes the marginal and average price per unit of energy different. Moreover, most 
utilities apply (increasing) block pricing schemes, which result in marginal prices that depend on 
the quantity consumed, but do not vary smoothly with it. The budget constraint will be 
piecewise linear, and for all households not at the beginning of the first block of consumption, 
the marginal and the average price will, clearly, be different. Even more important, marginal 
block price and consumption are simultaneously determined (Burtless and Hausman, 1978).  
In the presence of block pricing, which should be entered in the econometric model of 
consumption—marginal or average price? Howe and Linaweaver (1967) argue that the relevant 
variable is marginal block price. Taylor (1975) and Nordin (1976) include marginal price and a 
“difference” variable meant to account for the lump sum transfers implied by block rates, and 
propose ways to test the marginal price v. average price model. Later studies used instrumental 
variable estimation techniques to address the simultaneity of marginal price, quantity consumed, 
and “difference.”
6
                                                 
6 See McFadden et al. (1977) and Wilder and Willenberg (1975) for two different IV approaches, Hewitt and 
Hanemann (1995) for maximum likelihood estimation in the presence of block pricing. 
   10 
 
                                                
Reiss and White (2005) focus on the California households in the Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey (RECS), match each household with the block pricing structure applied by 
the utility that serves the area, and estimate a model of choice of block and consumption levels 
by GMM. Their price elasticity of electricity consumption is between -0.85 and -1.02, 
depending on the subsample and the exact specification of the model.  They also find a strong 
negative correlation between income and price elasticity.    
For lack of exact information about the block rates faced by the consumers, however, 
many studies (including Metcalf and Hassett, 1999, and ourselves, as we explain below) are 
forced to use average price. This is reasonable in light of much evidence that households 
respond to the average, rather than marginal, price. Shin (1985) argues that households will 
respond to average price, which is easily calculated from the electricity bill, rather than to actual 
block marginal price, which is costly to determine, and develops an empirical strategy for 
testing this conjecture.
7
When the average price is computed from the consumer’s bill divided by quantity, as is 
the case in RECS, it is endogenous with quantity. In our case, as we explain below, we impute 
each household the average price per unit of electricity or gas charged by the utilities in the area. 
This measure of price is exogenous to the household, but is affected by measurement error. We 
discuss this issue in section 3.C below. An additional concern is whether usage decisions 
depend on the price in the current (billing) period, on that of earlier periods, or a moving 
average of the prices of recent periods (Poyer and Williams, 1993). For good measure, in what 
follows we experiment with current price, as well as price of the previous period.   
 Borenstein (2008, 2009) likewise finds that consumers respond to an 
average price, rather than marginal price or expected marginal price.  
                                                 
7 Typically, U.S. electric utilities utilize a block rate design. This implies that the marginal price for each household 
varies with the quantity of electricity consumed, and can vary from season to season, making it difficult for a 
household to monitor.  11 
 
                                                
3. The Models and Econometric Estimation Issues   
A. Two Models of Residential Energy Demand 
Individuals and households do not derive utility directly from energy: They demand 
electricity and gas because they use them to produce goods (e.g., a warm home, meals, lighting, 
etc.) that enter as arguments in their utility function. Standard economic theory posits that the 
demand for energy at the residential level depends on energy prices, the prices of other goods, 
income, and other characteristics of the household (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). 
In this paper, we focus on the demand for gas and electricity, because they are the most 
important fuels used by households in the U.S. Electricity is used by virtually 100% of the 
households, and gas serves 60% of the households. Fuel oil (7% of the households), LPG 
(1.5%) and kerosene (1.5%) are less important.
8
We estimate two sets of models. In the first set, our regression equations are variants 
of the static energy demand model: 
  
(1) 


















it P P Q ε τ β β β + + + + + + = δ z γ x , 
where j=E, G for electricity and gas, respectively, i denotes the dwelling, and t denotes the time 
period. Q is consumption, P denotes price, and the coefficients on the log prices are the short-
term own- and cross-price elasticities.  
  Vectors x and z are dwelling and household characteristics thought to influence the 
consumption of energy.  Vector x includes weather, size and age of the home, heating and 
cooling equipment dummies, and appliances. For example, a house heated only with an electric 
heater would have a higher electricity demand than an identical home with gas heat. Household 
characteristics (z) include the number and age of occupants, income, the presence of children or 
                                                 
8 EIA, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=us_energy_homes (last accessed 28 Sept. 2010) 12 
 
                                                
elderly persons, and a homeownership dummy. Equation (1) includes year effects (the τs), and 
is  easily amended to include dwelling  or city-specific effects to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity.
9
  It is of interest to assess how consumption changes if individuals are allowed to adjust 
their stock of appliances and make energy efficiency and conservation investments.  A partial-
adjustment model  (Houthakker, 1980)  lets  individuals adjust their stock of appliances and 
energy-efficiency investments.  This model  assumes that the change in log actual demand 
between any two periods ( t−1 and t ) is only some fraction (λ) of the difference between log 
actual demand in period t−1 and the log of the long-run equilibrium demand in period t, 
 
*
t Q .  
Formally, 
(2)  ) ln (ln ln ln
*
1 t t t t Q Q Q Q − = − − λ , 
where 0<λ<1. The dwelling subscript i is omitted to avoid clutter. This implies that given an 
optimum, but unobservable, level of energy consumption, demand only gradually converges 
towards that optimum level between any two time periods.  
Assume that desired energy use (for example, desired electricity consumption) can be 
expressed as  ) exp(
* Xγ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
θ η α G E t P P Q ,  where  η  and  θ  are the long-term elasticities with 
respect to the price of the electricity and that of gas, and X is a vector of variables influencing 
demand for energy, including income, climate, characteristics of the stock of housing, income, 
etc.  On inserting this expression into (2), we get  
                                                 
9 A special case of this situation is when the dwelling-specific effects are suppressed, but the error terms in the 
demand for electricity and gas equations are correlated within the same dwelling unit in the same period (but 
uncorrelated in different period and across dwellings).  If so, the equations for log Q
(E) and log Q
(G) are part of a 
system of seemingly unrelated regression equation. Since the regressors are the same in the equations for log 
electricity and gas consumption, the most efficient estimation technique (GLS) is simplified to OLS applied 
separately to each equation.  
 13 
 
                                                
(3)  1 1 ln ln ln ln ln ln − − − + + + = − t G E t t Q P P Q Q λ λ λθ λη α λ Xγ . 
On re-arranging and appending an econometric error term, we obtain the regression equation: 
(4)  ε λ λ λθ λη α λ + − + + + + = −1 ln ) 1 ( ln ln ln ln t G E t Q P P Q γ X . 
  Equation (4) shows that the short-run elasticities are the regression coefficients on the 
log prices, whereas the long-run elasticities can be computed by dividing these short-run 
elasticities (i.e., the coefficients on the log prices) by the estimate of λ. In turn, the latter is 
easily obtained as 1 minus the coefficient on ln 1 − t Q . 
 
B. Estimation of the Dynamic Model 
  We wish to estimate the partial adjustment model (equation (4)) with fixed, dwelling-
specific effects. One concern with this specification is that the lagged dependent variable in the 
right-hand side may be serially correlated and hence correlated with the error term, which 
makes the LSDV and GLS estimators biased and inconsistent,  since  ) ( 1 , 1 , − − − i t i y y , where 
it it Q y ln = , is correlated with  ) ( i it ε ε −  (see Baltagi, 2001). The bias vanishes as T gets large, 
but the LSDV estimator remains biased and inconsistent for N large and T small, as is the case 
here, since we have tens of thousands of homes but the maximum length of the longitudinal 
component of the sample is 6.
10
Kiviet (1995) derives an approximation for the bias of the LSDV estimator when the 
errors are serially uncorrelated and the regressors are strongly exogenous, and proposes an 
estimator that is derived by subtracting a consistent estimate of this bias from the LSDV 
 
                                                 
10 We remind the reader that, when attention is restricted to those dwellings that appeared in more than one round of 
AHS survey, we have an unbalanced panel with T ranging from 2 to 6.  A similar argument applies if we use 
dwelling-household effects instead of dwelling effects.  14 
 
                                                
estimator. An alternative approach is to first-difference the data, thus swiping out the state-
specific effects: 
(5)   
it it t i it y y ε γ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ ⋅ = ∆ − β w 1 ,  
where w denotes all exogenous regressors in the right-hand side of equation (4), and to use 
2 , − t i y  and  it w ∆  as instruments for 
1 , − ∆ t i y  (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). 
  Arellano and Bond (1991) point out that the latter approach is inefficient and argue that 
additional instruments can be obtained  by exploiting the orthogonality conditions that exist 
between the lagged values of 
t i y ,   and the disturbances.  The Arellano-Bond procedure is a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that is implemented in two steps. In practice, 
the Arellano-Bond estimator has been shown to be biased in small samples, and the bias 
increases with the number of instruments and orthogonality conditions. Moreover, Arellano and 
Bond (1991) show that the asymptotic approximation of the standard errors of their two-step 
GMM estimator is biased downwards, and they, as well as Judson and Owen (1999), find that 
the one-step estimator outperforms the two-step estimator.  
Under the additional assumption of quasi-stationarity of 
t i y , , 
1 , − ∆ t i y  is uncorrelated with 
it ε , and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest a “system” GMM estimation where one stacks the 
model in the levels and in the first differences, imposes the cross-equation restriction that the 
coefficients entering in the two models be the same, and uses the full set of instruments 
(corresponding to the full set of orthogonality conditions for both models). Blundell and Bond 
report that in simulation the “system” GMM estimator is more efficient and stable than the 
Arellano-Bond procedure. This is the approach we adopt for the partial adjustment model. 
 
C. Mismeasured Prices 15 
 
                                                
As we explain in more detail in section 4, in this study the price of energy is measured 
with an error, because we do not know the exact price(s) faced by the household and impute the 
average price paid by residential customers in that area.  
Standard econometric theory shows when a regressor is mismeasured, and the 
measurement error is classical, the estimated regression coefficient is downward biased (Greene, 
2008, page 325-326). In our case, we must keep in mind that the mismeasured price enters in the 
construction of the dependent variable as well as in the right-hand side of the model as a 












ε β α + ⋅ + =
*
* ln ln ,  
Where subscript i denotes the dwelling A is the utility bill at time t,  *
it p  is nominal price, and 




 In this simplified model, the 
own price elasticity is β. Variable    is mismeasured. Specifically, we assume that 
) exp(
* e p p ⋅ = , so  e p p + = ln ln
* . 
Equation (6) can be re-written as 




where  β β + =1 1  and  β β − = 2 . The elasticity with respect to price is thus the LSDV coefficient 
on log price,  1 ˆ β , minus 1.  
Is this estimate consistent or biased? Suppose that the measurement error is 
approximately constant within a dwelling over time. If this is the case, then the measurement 
                                                 
11 City-level Consumer Price Indices are taken from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) at 
http://www.bls.gov/data/ by selecting “urban consumer series” for all items. Prices are then divided by the ratio of 
the annual CPI to the year 2007 CPI, to convert to constant 2007 dollars. 16 
 
                                                
error is swiped out by the LSDV procedure, which produces consistent estimates of the slopes in 
equation (1).  
Consider now the situation where the measurement error is completely uncorrelated 
within and between the units in every period. If the measurement error is classical, then it can be 
shown that  
(8) 
) (ln ) ( ) ln , (ln ) (ln ) (ln
) ln , (ln ) (ln ) (ln ˆ lim
2
2
1 1 CPI Var e Var CPI p Cov CPI Var p Var
CPI p Cov CPI Var p Var
p
⋅ + − ⋅
− ⋅
⋅ = β β , 
where plim denotes the probability limit, and variances and covariances are computed using the 
deviations from the dwelling means.  Clearly,  1 ˆ β  underestimates the true  1 β , and so, since β is 
negative and β = -1, the price elasticity will be overstated (i.e., the absolute value of the 
estimated coefficient will be greater than  | | β ).  
  Equation (7) also shows that the price elasticity is the negative of the coefficient on ln 
CPI. Unfortunately, this coefficient is estimated consistently using LSDV only if ln CPI is 
uncorrelated with the log price of electricity, or (as shown in expressions (9)-(10) below), β=-1.  
In our case, ln CPI is positively correlated with the log price of electricity (correlation 
coefficient 0.37), and β is likely different from -1, and so the bias induced by the measurement 
error on price is propagated to the coefficient on ln CPI. For large samples,  
(9)  m m p ⋅ + + − = ⋅ + = ) 1 ( ˆ lim 1 2 2 β β β β β , 
where  
(10)   
) (ln ) ( ) ln , (ln ) (ln ) (ln
) ln , (ln ) (
2 CPI Var e Var CPI p Cov CPI Var p Var
CPI p Cov e Var
m
⋅ + − ⋅
⋅
= . 
Again, in expression (10) variances and covariances are based on deviations from the 
dwelling means. It is difficult to sign the bias, because it depends on the magnitude of the true 
1 β17 
 
                                                
elasticity. In our case, term m in expression (10) is clearly positive. Term  ) 1 ( β +  is positive if 
the true price elasticity is negative but small (i.e.,  1 | | < β ), in which case  2 ˆ β  is biased away from 
zero, and its opposite ( 2 ˆ β − ) overstates the true elasticity. If the true elasticity β is large (i.e., 
greater than 1 in absolute value), then term  ) 1 ( β +  is negative,  2 ˆ β  is biased towards zero and its 
opposite understates the true elasticity. 
How can one get around the  mismeasurement  problem?  One approach is to restrict 
estimation to areas where mismeasurement is likely to be less severe (e.g., areas with only one 
utility). Another is to instrument for 
* ln it p , which we do using state-level electricity and gas 
prices, or, in alternate runs, lagged electricity prices. The results obtained in this fashion can be 
compared with those from equation (1) directly, and with those from equation (7).  
 
4. The Sample and the Data  
  In addition to data provided by individual utilities for their service territories (e.g., 
Borenstein, 2008, 2009) or otherwise geographically circumscribed areas  (e.g., Shin, 1985; 
Garcia-Cerrutti, 2000, Bushnell and Mansur, 2005), earlier research has used the Department of 
Energy’s Residential Energy Consumption Survey to examine energy use patterns at the 
household level (e.g., Metcalf and Hassett, 1999, Reiss and White, 2005). Despite its national 
coverage, we were dissatisfied with this dataset, because it does not lend itself to panel data 
modeling (the length of the longitudinal component is at most 2), and the geographical 18 
 
                                                
identification is at too coarse a level to link each household with the relevant utilities (or to 
state-level or local policies or incentives).
12
  For these reasons, we assembled a large and comprehensive dataset that merged several 
sources of data. We use the American Housing Survey, a longitudinal study conducted by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development where the cross-sectional units are dwellings 
(not households). The AHS contains extensive information about the structural characteristics 
of the dwelling, renovations and retrofits, home ownership and its financial aspects (mortgages, 
maintenance costs, etc.), appliances and heating/cooling systems, socio-demographic and 
economic circumstances of the occupants, and their assessment of the quality of the home and 
the neighborhood.  
  
  We focus on “national” survey AHS data for 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007, 
which means that we can follow homes for up to T=6 periods.  We augment this sample with 
observations from the AHS “metro”
13
  Because of privacy concerns, the AHS discloses the location of the dwelling only if the 
area has a population of 100,000 or more. We selected dwellings in the 54 cities corresponding 
to the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. as of 2008, unless the AHS SMSA identification 
makes it impossible to identify unambiguously which state the dwelling is located in. Table 1 
lists the “candidate” metro areas (the 50 largest in the U.S. as of 2008) and indicates which are 
 surveys, which are conducted in even years in specific 
areas. We use the 2002,  2004  and 2007 metro  surveys.  Homes in the metro surveys are 
surveyed only once, so our sample is a mix of panel data plus multi-year cross-sections.  
                                                 
12 RECS provides the Census Region for each household. It provides the state identifier only if the household 
resides in one of the four most populous states (California, New York, Texas and Florida). HDD and CDD 
information is provided, but the true figures at the household’s location are masked to ensure confidentiality.   
13 The Nationwide AHS sample returns to the same homes for every survey, and adds some newly constructed 
homes to keep the sample representative of the housing stock in the U.S.. The metro surveys are conducted on a 
representative sample of homes in different cities every two years, but in the metro surveys different homes are 
selected in different waves for the same city. 19 
 
                                                
included in our study. These locations should ensure considerable variation in climate, age of 
the stock of housing and construction materials (which may affect efficiency of space heating 
and cooling), and utility prices.  
 
Table 1. Metropolitan areas selected for the study. 
metro area  Included?*  metro area  Included?* 




Austin-Round Rock, TX  yes 
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, 
TN  yes 
Baltimore-Towson, MD  yes  New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA  yes 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL  yes 






Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH  yes  Oklahoma City, OK  yes 





MD  no 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 
yes 
(Chicago)  Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ  yes 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN  no  Pittsburgh, PA  yes 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH  yes  Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA  yes 
Columbus, OH  yes  Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 
yes 
(Providence) 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  yes  Raleigh-Cary, NC  yes 
Denver-Aurora, CO \2  yes  Richmond, VA  yes 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI  yes  Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA  yes 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT  yes  Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA  yes 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX  yes  St. Louis, MO-IL \3  no 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN  yes  Salt Lake City, UT  yes 
Jacksonville, FL  yes  San Antonio, TX  yes 
Kansas City, MO-KS  no  San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA  yes 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV  yes  San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA  yes 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA  yes  San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA  yes 
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN  not there  Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA  yes 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR  no  Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL  yes 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL  yes  Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC  no 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI  yes 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-
WV  no 
* Eligible because of unambiguous state identification in the AHS 
 20 
 
                                                
  Our sample is restricted to single-family homes and duplexes. We further restrict 
attention to homes that are owner-occupied or occupied by a tenant, and where these persons 
actually are responsible for paying the utility bills.
14 These criteria yielded a sample size of 
120,333 observations. We deleted observations where i) the home was occupied as a residence 
for only part of the year, ii) the utility bills had been imputed using “hot deck” procedures, iii) 
the square footage  (which should be an important determinant of energy usage)  had been 
imputed using “hot deck” procedures, and/or iv) large and implausible changes in size where 
observed from one time period to the next.
15
  Table 2 displays the distribution of this final sample by city.  Table 3 summarizes 
information about the longitudinal component of our sample, examining the case where the 
cross-sectional units are the dwellings, and that where the cross-sectional units are dwelling-
families. We have a total of 69,169 homes and 74,697 households (because families may move 
into and out of any given home during the study period). 
 This left us with 98,774 observations, which are 
further reduced to 98,772 when we further exclude residences where the heating equipment is 
shared with other units (2 observations).  
 
 
   
                                                 
14 In other words, we exclude tenants where the utilities are included in the rent. Incentives to save on utilities may 
be different in this case.  
15 Specifically, we excluded observations with a change in the amount of energy or gas used that changed by more 
than 500% from one period to the next, while at the same time no renovation in the home and no square foot 
change was reported. Homes that experienced a change in square footage of more than 1000% from one period to 
the next, or with a change in square footage of more than 100% without a reported renovation to the home, were 




                                                
Table 2. Distribution of the sample by city. N=98,772. 
City  Nobs  Percent  City  Nobs  Percent 
Anaheim  3,618  3.66  Minneapolis  2,112  2.14 
Atlanta  3,335  3.38  Monmouth  339  0.34 
Austin  193  0.2  Nashville  275  0.28 
Baltimore  1,522  1.54  New Orleans  2,387  2.42 
Bergen-Passaic  428  0.43  New York  2,585  2.62 
Birmingham  343  0.35  Newark  612  0.62 
Boston  1,754  1.78  Northern New Jersey  659  0.67 
Boulder  91  0.09  Oakland  793  0.8 
Buffalo  1,739  1.76  Oklahoma City  2,752  2.79 
Charlotte  2,681  2.71  Orlando  434  0.44 
Chicago  4,306  4.36  Phoenix  3,665  3.71 
Cleveland  3,137  3.18  Pittsburgh  3,313  3.35 
Columbus  3,315  3.36  Providence  271  0.27 
Dallas  3,488  3.53  Raleigh-Durham  280  0.28 
Denver  2,415  2.45  Riverside San Bernardino  3,883  3.93 
Detroit  3,467  3.51  Sacramento  2,584  2.62 
Ft. Worth  2,992  3.03  Salt Lake  532  0.54 
Hartford  2,010  2.03  San Antonio  2,781  2.82 
Houston  2,430  2.46  San Diego  2,978  3.02 
Indianapolis  2,908  2.94  San Francisco  502  0.51 
Jacksonville  357  0.36  San Jose  579  0.59 
Jersey City  91  0.09  Santa Rosa  90  0.09 
Las Vegas  453  0.46  Seattle  2,706  2.74 
Los Angeles  4,870  4.93  Tacoma  224  0.23 
Miami  4,115  4.17  Tampa  2,089  2.11 
Middlesex County  300  0.3  Tucson  355  0.36 
Milwaukee  2,295  2.32  West Palm Beach  339  0.34 
 
Table 3. Distribution of the sample by length of the longitudinal component. N=98,772. 
  Unit: dwelling  Unit: dwelling-family 
capitalT (length of the panel)  Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent 
1  58,088  58.81  63,916  64.71 
2  7,094  7.18  9,616  9.74 
3  5,315  5.38  6,126  6.2 
4  8,232  8.33  6,236  6.31 
5  10,905  11.04  6,740  6.82 
6  9,138  9.25  6,138  6.21 
 22 
 
                                                
B. Energy Consumption and Utilities’ Rates 
  The AHS reports the average monthly utility bill (and annual payments on heating oil 
fuel for those households that use heating oil) in  the survey  year, but does not report  the 
electricity  or  gas  tariffs, nor the actual energy  consumption (in kilowatt-hours [kWh]  or 
thousand cubic feet [MCF]).  
We must therefore construct consumption by taking the bills and dividing them by unit 
price. Unfortunately, the names of the utilities and the rate structure are not identified in the 
AHS either, so we were forced to impute average tariffs per KWh and cubic foot of gas for each 
dwelling in a number of ways.  
  For each metropolitan area, we identified the relevant gas and electric utilities using the 
listings provided by the state public utility commission, and a variety of on-line city services. 
We also consulted the list of counties covered by each utility, as documented in the EIA 861 
forms database. We obtained  utility-level  price information from the Energy Information 
Agency (EIA) 861 forms (for electricity) and EIA 176 forms (for gas), which the utilities are 
required to file every year with the agency. Next, if the area was supplied by a single utility, we 
computed the average price per kWh  (MCF)  as the utility’s annual revenue from sales to 
residential customers divided by the kWhs (MCFs) sold to residential customers.
16
  If the area was supplied by more than one utility, we first computed the average price 
charged by each of them in the aforementioned fashion, and then constructed three alternative 
measures of price to use in our regressions. One, which we dub “residential price 1,” is a 
weighted average of each utility’s average tariff per KWh, where the weights are proportional 
to the utility’s customer base. The next, which we dub “residential price 2,” is also a weighted 
  
                                                 
16 We note here that the EIA computes state-level electricity prices and gas prices exactly in this fashion—by taking 
the revenues of all utilities and dividing by all kWhs (or gas) served to residential households.  23 
 
                                                
average, with weights assigned to represent the utility’s dominance of the market.
17 The final 
constructed price (“residential price 3”) is a simple average of the individual utilities’ average 
tariffs.
18
  We use the prices of electricity and gas in two ways. First, we use them to create the 
dependent variables in our regressions: Consumption of electricity and gas are obtained as the 
amount on the bill divided by (nominal) price. Second, (real) prices enter in the right-hand side 
of the demand equations.   
 We followed a similar approach for gas utilities.  
  We note here that, technically speaking, these average prices are not necessarily equal to 
the prices faced by the households. The majority of the utilities apply block pricing, but with 
such a geographically broad sample and such a long study period, it would be unfeasible to 
obtain the block pricing schemes used by each utility in each period. The only  remaining 
econometric concern is that the price we use in our regression is measured with error. With our 
model and data construction,  as explained in section 3.C, this would make the household 
demand appear to be more elastic than it truly is. 
  We display descriptive statistics about prices and energy use in table 4. Attention is 
restricted to the “price 1” variables because the others were very close to them.
19
                                                 
17 If a utility dominates the market completely, despite the nominal existence of other utilities, that utility received a 
weight of ones and the others weights equal to zero. If two utilities were perceived to share the market in the area in 
a relatively equitable fashion, we assigned weights of 0.5 to each.  
  Every home 
is served by electricity, and, as shown in table 4, on average our households use about 930 
KWh per month. This is in line with nationwide estimates collected by the Department of 
Energy using a dedicated survey (RECS). Just over three-quarters of the sample (76.6%) use 
natural gas as well, and almost 88% of such natural-gas connected households use gas heat. In a 
typical month, gas usage is 7.27 MCF.  
18 Clearly, if there is a single utility, residential price 1, 2 and 3 are all identical.  
19 The correlation coefficients between the “price 1” variables and the others were generally higher than 0.97.  24 
 
                                                
  Over the study period, the average price of electricity is about 11 cents per kWh 
(2007$). We found, however, evidence of considerable variation across states. The state with 
the lowest prices is Indiana (about 6.8 cents per kWh on average over the study period) and that 
with the highest prices is New York, where a kWh averaged almost 18 cents over the study 
period (2007$). The price of natural gas exhibits similar variability across locales. The average 
price per MCF is $11.41 (2007$), with Georgia exhibiting the lowest prices ($6.10, 2007$, on 
average) and Florida the highest ($17.83, 2007$).  
 
Table 4. Prices and monthly consumption of electricity and natural gas.  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.   Min  Max 
kwh1 (monthly electricity usage, KWh)  97344  930.39  654.09  11.06  5697.54 
gasuse1 (monthly gas usage, MCF)  67154  7.27  5.50  0.23  71.86 
residentialprice1_r (price of electricity per 
kWh, 2007 dollars)  98487  0.11  0.03  0.05  0.22 
gasprice1_r (price of natural gas per MCF, 
2007 dollars)  94315  11.42  3.10  3.90  22.89 
                 
Log kwh1  97344  6.61  0.70  2.40  8.65 
Log gasuse1  67154  1.75  0.68  -1.49  4.27 
Log residentialprice1_r  98487  -2.23  0.26  -2.92  -1.49 
Log gasprice1_r  94315  2.40  0.26  1.36  3.13 
 
 
Since we exploit the longitudinal feature of our data, it is important to check the extent 
of the variation in prices across and within units. In what follows, the units are the dwellings. 
We computed the total variation of real electricity prices and of log real electricity prices, and 
found that in each case the variation within dwellings accounted for only 4% of the total 
variation.
20
                                                 
20 Our measure of variation is the sum of square deviations from the grand mean. 
 Gas prices are more variable over time: the “within” dwelling variation accounts for 25 
 
                                                
about 14% of total variation in real gas prices, and 15% of the total variation for log real gas 
prices. 
 
C. Other Key Regressors  
  The weather is an important determinant of energy use. We computed heating and 
cooling degree-days (HDDs and CDDs) in the year prior to the date of the AHS survey using 
the T3 Global  Summaries of the Day from NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center. We 
matched each metro area with the T3 monitors in that area, computed the average of the mean 
temperatures for each day of the year prior to the date of the survey, created the HDD (CDD) 
for that day as 65°F minus the average temperature (average temperature minus 65°F), and 
summed over the year prior to the survey.  This construction is the same as that used by the 
U.S. Department of Energy. The average HDDs and CDDs are 3450 and 1658 degree-days, 
respectively.  
  Our regressions control for dwelling characteristics, such as the age and size of the 
home, number of rooms, and  number of floors, which come from the AHS.  We enter all 
continuous variables in log form in the regression. Descriptive statistics for these variables are 
displayed in table 5. The average size of the home is about 2000 square feet. This figure 
matches up nicely with the nationwide estimates for single-family homes and homes that are 
part of a two-unit building from the 1997, 2001, and 2005 RECS.  
 
   26 
 
                                                
Table 5. House characteristics.  
all observations 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Unitsf (square footage)  91254  2073.96  1615.04  99  18083 
basement  98772  0.37  0.48  0  1 
Floors  98772  1.83  0.96  1  21 
Rooms  98772  6.42  1.86  1  21 
House age  98772  38.69  23.27  0  88 
more than 400 sq ft and less than 10,000 sq ft, no more than 4 floors 
Unitsf  88732  1950.42  1141.95  400  9911 
basement  88732  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Floors  88732  1.77  0.83  1  4 
Rooms  88732  6.47  1.83  1  21 
Houseage  88732  37.64  22.84  0  88 
   
  Despite removing observations with imputed square footage and implausible changes in 
square footage from one survey wave to the next, our sample does contain some observations 
with extremely small and extremely large values for size and the number of floors, so in our 
regressions we further restrict attention to homes no smaller than 400 square feet and no larger 
than 10,000. We also delete from the usable sample homes with more than 4 floors (single 
family homes are unlikely to have 5 or more floors).  
  Descriptive statistics for this cleaned sample are reported in the bottom panel of table 5. 
The average square footage, house age and number of rooms are virtually unchanged. We note 
that a value of zero for the age of the house is correct: it means that the home was built in the 
same year of the survey. (The AHS does add new dwellings to mirror the stock of housing and 
new constructions. Homes with age 0 account for less than 1% of the sample.) 
  We report descriptive statistics about heating and cooling equipment, as well as 
appliances that use energy, in table 6.  All of this information comes from the AHS. Briefly, in 
terms of heating, about 67% of the sample has a gas heating system, 26% relies on electricity 27 
 
                                                
for heating, and about 5% on heating oil as the main source of heat. Homes with electric heat 
are located primarily in states with mild or warm climates, such as Arizona (66% of all Arizona 
homes), Florida (93.80%), Louisiana (43%), Tennessee (59%) and Texas (43.76%), or cheap 
electricity (e.g., Washington, 29%).  
  About 84% of the sample has some type of air conditioning, and about 67% has central 
air conditioning. Window units are used by 20% of the sample, sometimes alongside with 
central air conditioning. Only 2% of the observations have gas-powered heat pumps. 
  Turning to appliances, virtually all homes have a fridge, almost 72% a dishwasher, 32% 
use gas-powered clothes dryers, and a little more than half of the sample has an electric stove.   
 
Table 6. Heating and cooling equipment and appliances. 
Variable  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
gas_heat (gas heat)  98772  0.67  0.47  0  1 
el_heat (electric heat)  98772  0.26  0.44  0  1 
fueloil_heat (heating 
oil heat)  98772  0.05  0.23  0  1 
Windowac (window 
A/C units)  98772  0.21  0.40  0  1 
Numair (number of 
rooms with A/C)  20251  1.78  1.02  1  8 
Centralac (central A/C)  98772  0.67  0.47  0  1 
gasAC (gas heat pump 
for A/C)  98772  0.03  0.16  0  1 
Anyac (any type of A/C 
present)  98772  0.84  0.37  0  1 
                 
Fridge (refrigerator)  98772  0.9981  0.04  0  1 
Dishwasher   98772  0.72  0.45  0  1 
g_dryer (gas powered 
clothes dryer)  98772  0.32  0.47  0  1 
e_stove (electric 
stove)  98772  0.53  0.50  0  1 
 28 
 
                                                
  Summary statistics of household characteristics are shown in table 7. Briefly, we find 
that the average household income over the study period is about $88,000 (2007$). There are a 
small number of households (93, or 0.09%) that report negative income. When these persons 
are removed, the distribution of household income is essentially unchanged: The new sample 
average is still $88,000 (2007$).
21
    
   The average household size is 2.8, 31% of the sample has 
small children, 22% has at least one person aged 65 or older living in this house, and almost 
84% owns the home.   
  Table 7.  Household characteristics.  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Household income in thou. 2007$   98772  87.92  115.49  -42.33  11473.2 
Number of household members  98772  2.81  1.52  1  17 
Young child (12 or less) lives in this 
house  98772  0.31  0.46  0  1 
Elderly person (65+) lives in this house   98772  0.23  0.42  0  1 






A. Static Models 
Results for several specifications of the static model (see equation 1) are reported in 
table 10 for log electricity consumption, and in table 11 for log gas consumption. The runs differ 
for the type of effects we include to account for unobserved heterogeneity.   
We choose to report results for fixed city-, dwelling-  and dwelling-family specific 
effects. We include  city-specific effects because 1) the coefficients on most regressors are 
similar to those from a random effects model with dwelling-specific effects (estimated using 
                                                 
21 In our regressions, which use log income, we will simply recode log income to zero when income is negative.  29 
 
                                                
GLS), 2) it stands to reason that homes and  residents  might share similar unobservable 
characteristics as other homes and residents in the same metro area, 3) we do not lose the 
observations with T=1, and 4) we are able to assess the impact on consumption of factors that 
vary widely across locales (e.g., home size, income, etc.) but little within a house over time. 
Fixed dwelling effects are a natural candidate, since the AHS follows a dwelling over 
time, while dwelling-family effects  allow for unobservable heterogeneity to depend on the 
household as well as the home.
22
Starting with table 10, most of the coefficients are significant and have the expected 
sign. Importantly, column (A)—the results of a model with city-specific effects—shows that the 
elasticity of electricity use with respect to the price of electricity is -0.860, and the cross-
elasticity with respect to the price of gas is positive and equal to 0.117, indicating that the two 
are substitutes.
 We prefer fixed effects because Hausman tests indicate that if 
the unobserved heterogeneity is modeled using random effects, these are correlated with the 
included regressors, which makes the GLS estimates inconsistent. For good measure, the 
standard errors are clustered at  the  city  level  (in specifications with city effects) or at the 
dwelling level (in specifications with dwelling and dwelling-household effects).   
23
Consumption of electricity increases by 22%  for every 10% increase in the square 
footage of the home, is 16% higher if the home has air conditioning, and about 15% higher if the 
home is heated using electricity. Dishwashers and electrical stoves increase usage by 8% and 
7%, respectively  (not  displayed in the table).  F tests reject the null hypotheses that 
heating/cooling systems are jointly equal to zero (F statistic = 37.65, p value less than 0.0001) 
  
                                                 
22 The fixed effects also account for any selection of households into cities or homes.  
23 It is useful to compare these figures with their counterparts in an OLS regression that ignores unobserved 
heterogeneity. The own price elasticity when the city effects are suppressed is -1. Adding state effects (but no city 
effects) makes it -0.894. 30 
 
                                                
and that the appliances are not associated with electricity consumption (F statistic = 38.05, p 
value less than 0.0001). 
The income elasticity of electricity consumption is only about 0.02. One reason for such 
a low elasticity might be the fact that income is highly correlated with characteristics of the 
home, such as the size, the number of floors, and the presence of certain appliances. Once we 
removed these from the specification, income elasticity of electricity usage increased to almost 
0.05.  
Column (B) presents the results of a FE specification where the cross-sectional units are 
the homes. The own price elasticity is lower (-0.667), as expected, but the cross-price elasticity 
is slightly stronger. As expected, the coefficients on most other variables are much smaller than 
their counterparts in the city-specific effects specification, because these variables rarely change 
within a home over time. In column (C), we present the results of a model with dwelling-
household specific effects. They are similar to those in column (B), with slightly stronger own- 
and cross-price elasticities.  
In the gas equation, columns (A)-(C) of table 11 show that the own price elasticity 
ranges from -0.693 (city-specific effects) to -0.565 (dwelling-specific effects). The model with 
dwelling-household effects produces a price elasticity of -0.577. The cross-price elasticity is 
positive (0.150) and indicates that gas and electricity are substitutes in the model with city-
specific effects (column (A)), but turns insignificant when we use dwelling-specific effects, and 
negative and insignificant in the model with dwelling-family effects.  
The model with city-specific effects indicates that gas usage increases by 19% for every 
10 percentage point increase in the square footage of the home, and is about 24% larger in 31 
 
                                                
homes with gas heating systems. The impact of these variables is small and statistically 
insignificant in the variants with dwelling- and dwelling-household effects.  
 
B. Robustness checks 
  Our first order of business is to examine the size of the potential bias due to 
measurement errors in the prices of electricity and gas. To see if such a bias is severe, we began 
with regressions where the sample is restricted to metro areas served by one utility. We argue 
that the measurement error due to our price imputation procedure is smaller in single-utility 
areas. For electricity usage, the results of these runs are reported in columns (D) and (E) of table 
10 for the models with dwelling-specific effects and dwelling-family effects. Similar models for 
gas usage are displayed in columns (D) and (E) of table 11. Clearly, the own-price elasticities 
are very close (and slightly higher than) to their counterparts in columns (B) and (C).  
Next, we estimated a log kWh model with fixed dwelling-specific effects, the regressors 
as in table 10, and log electricity price (but no gas price). If we do not instrument for electricity 
price, the own price elasticity is -0.6794. When we instrument for log electricity price using the 
log  of the state  average  prices  of electricity and gas as the identifying instruments, the 
coefficient on log price is -.67907.
24
Finally, we estimated a model similar to equation (7), namely one where the dependent 
variable is log electricity bill, the right-hand side includes fixed dwelling-specific effects, all 
  Using log state-level electricity price as the only 
identifying instrument produces an own price elasticity of electricity demand of  -0.6584, while 
replacing that with the first lag of log price of electricity in the metro area yields an elasticity of  
-0.6108.  
                                                 
24 Our instruments are in the spirit of Black and Kniesner (2003), who propose using another mismeasured variable 
(i.e., state-level annual average prices) to clean out the measurement error in the original mismeasured regressor 
(here, average price in the metro area).  32 
 
                                                
other controls, the log of nominal electricity price and the log of the CPI (but no gas price). The 
coefficient on log nominal electricity price is 0.3223 and that on log CPI is 0.5981. The 
corresponding estimates of the elasticity with respect to the price of electricity are -0.6777 and -
0.5891 (from the coefficient on log price and log CPI, respectively). Although we argue in 
section 3.C that these are both likely to overstate the true elasticity, they are within 10-15% of 
the original estimates and of the IV estimates of the price elasticity, suggesting that the impact 
of measurement error is modest. 
Observers sometimes speculate that high price elasticities might be capturing the effect 
of conservation and energy efficiency installations made possible by the utilities' DSM 
initiatives.
25
To check if consumption depends on current or recent prices, we also estimated models 
similar to the ones shown in tables 10 and 11, but where we further included lagged prices. We 
found that i) the coefficients on contemporaneous price were strongly significant and similar to 
their counterparts in table 10 and 11, and ii) the coefficients on lagged prices were very small in 
magnitude and insignificant at the conventional levels. This is unsurprising if we recall that the 
“previous period” is usually two years prior to the current observations. We would expect 
people to react to changes in recent billing periods, and billing periods are usually one month 
(see Reiss and White, 2008). 
 We do have the DSM expenditure per customer by the electrical utilities that serve 
any given metro area, and, indeed, it is indeed positively correlated with electricity price 
(correlation coefficient 0.28). However, when we add DSM expenditure per customer (in real 
terms) in the right-hand side of the log KWh model, the coefficient on log electricity price is 
virtually unchanged (-0.657). 
                                                 
25 We are grateful to Mark Jacobsen, personal communication, 2010, for raising this issue. 33 
 
                                                
To make that our results are not driven by outliers, we experimented with trimming the 
sample, e.g., we excluded the observations in the bottom and top 1%, 2.5%, etc. of the 
distribution of kWhs and MCFs. The elasticities and most other coefficients remained virtually 
the same as those in tables 10 and 11.  
In columns (F) and (G) of tables 10 and 11, we report regression results for the 
subsamples with electric heat and gas heat. We report only the results for the models with city-
specific effects for the sake of brevity, but the same qualitative results hold for the models with 
dwelling- and dwelling-households effects (although the magnitude of the coefficients is slightly 
smaller). In contrast to earlier literature (Metcalf and Hassett, 1999; Reiss and White, 2005), we 
find  households with electric heating systems are actually less  responsive to the price of 
electricity than households that use gas heat. Households with gas heat are slightly more 
sensitive to the price of gas than households that use electric heat.   
  However, Wald tests of the null that the elasticities are the same across the two groups 
fail to reject the null. For example, if attention is restricted to the equations in columns (F) and 
(G) of table 10, the Wald statistic of the null of identical own price elasticities is only 1.13 (p-
value 0.29).  
The Wald statistics are even smaller in runs with fixed dwelling (or dwelling-household) 
effects. One possible explanation for this is that the sample size is rather uneven across the 
groups of homes served with electric and gas heat. The number of observations with electric 
heat is 23542, but drops to 8416 when only true “panels” are used. This is only about 8% of the 
total sample.  The resulting increase in variance may help explain the lack of significant 
differences across the two subsamples. 34 
 
                                                
  Finally, we estimated models where we allow the responsiveness to energy prices to vary 
with the quartile of the income distribution that the household falls in. We find that the 
responsiveness to prices is a bit higher in the first quartile, and declines monotonically by 
quartile. For example, the elasticity of electricity consumption with respect to electricity price is 
-0.681 among households in the first income quartile, -0.673 among those in the second quartile, 
-0.663 among those in the third, and -0.645 among those in the fourth. An F test of the null that 
these elasticities are all identical rejects the null at the 1% level or better (F statistic=15.96, p-
value less than 0.0001). 
 
C. Dynamic Models and Models with Investments. 
  Turning to the partial adjustment model, we report results based on the Blundell-Bond 
estimation procedure in table 12. Column (A) shows that the short-run own price elasticity of 
electricity consumption is -0.736, and the long-run one is -0.814, while the short-run cross-price 
elasticity (with respect to gas) is 0.265, and the long-run one is 0.293. For gas consumption, 
shown in column (C), the short-run own price elasticity is -0.572 and the long-run one is -0.647. 
The price of electricity is not significant in the gas equations. These equations include controls 
for the heating and cooling system, and we interpret them to imply adjustment when the current 
heating and cooling technology is considered irreversible.    
In specifications (B) and (D) for electricity and gas, respectively, we exclude heating, 
cooling, and appliance dummies from the regression and interpret the result to apply when the 
choice of heating and cooling technology is reversible. It has been argued that durable goods 
and heating and cooling equipment are variable in the long-run, hence these specifications 
should  result  in a more pronounced response to energy prices.  In  fact, we do find slightly 35 
 
                                                
elevated price elasticities, but the differences are minor, on the order of 2% for electricity 
regressions, and 6% for gas regressions. 
    36 
 
                                                
Table 10. Static Model: Selected Regression Results. Dependent variable: log of electricity 
usage (lkWh1) 
  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) only one 
utility  
(E) only one 
utility 
(F) electric 
heat  (G) gas heat 
log elec price 
-0.860***  -0.667***  -0.681***  -0.685***  -0.692***  -0.679**  -0.825*** 
(-9.37)  (-9.69)  (-8.16)  (-8.26)  (-6.82)  (-3.22)  (-8.12) 
log gas price 
0.117*  0.122*  0.139*  0.115*  0.107  0.126*  0.102 
(2.02)  (2.45)  (2.36)  (1.97)  (1.58)  (2.04)  (1.63) 
log sq. ft. 
0.216***  0.0593  0.0522  0.0538  0.0396  0.226***  0.220*** 
(11.05)  (1.64)  (1.21)  (1.29)  (0.81)  (7.12)  (9.15) 
House Age 
0.00553***  -0.00477  -0.00195  -0.00164  -0.000416  0.00685***  0.00517*** 
(8.38)  (-1.70)  (-0.53)  (-0.48)  (-0.09)  (7.44)  (7.39) 
Age ^2 
-




(-7.56)  (1.69)  (0.81)  (0.43)  (0.10)  (-5.19)  (-6.80) 
Owns the Home 
0.0696***  -0.0558  0.0408  -0.0803  0.0215  0.0899**  0.0518** 
(4.86)  (-1.69)  (0.70)  (-1.79)  (0.26)  (3.33)  (3.25) 
No. of Rooms 
0.0659***  0.0159***  0.0103  0.0202***  0.0130  0.0701***  0.0626*** 
(14.74)  (3.42)  (1.94)  (3.39)  (1.91)  (8.14)  (14.07) 
No. of Floors 
-0.0171*  0.0371  0.0297  0.0425  0.0297  -0.0524**  0.00476 
(-2.07)  (1.34)  (0.85)  (1.29)  (0.71)  (-3.35)  (0.59) 
log Hhold Income 
0.0225***  0.00906*  0.00677  0.0107*  0.00804  0.0251***  0.0208*** 
(8.83)  (2.30)  (1.49)  (2.12)  (1.38)  (6.10)  (8.08) 
youngchild 
0.0963***  0.0721***  0.0353  0.0614**  0.0335  0.0913***  0.0964*** 
(15.06)  (4.24)  (1.48)  (2.82)  (1.09)  (11.36)  (11.93) 
elderly 
-0.0390***  -0.0204  -0.00932  -0.0137  -0.00911  -0.0154  -0.0400*** 
(-4.20)  (-0.88)  (-0.32)  (-0.49)  (-0.25)  (-0.95)  (-4.22) 
lcdd 
0.0727***  0.0299  0.0250  0.0417  0.0272  0.141**  0.0762** 
(3.58)  (1.07)  (0.78)  (1.20)  (0.68)  (3.14)  (3.33) 
lhdd 
0.00350  -0.0123  0.00277  -0.0278  -0.0244  0.0393  0.0384 
(0.07)  (-0.39)  (0.07)  (-0.58)  (-0.42)  (0.63)  (0.54) 
Gas Heat 
-0.0990**  -0.0152  -0.0183  -0.00105  -0.0704       
(-2.79)  (-0.17)  (-0.18)  (-0.01)  (-0.56)       
Electric Heat 
0.154***  0.106  0.123  0.117  0.0722       
(4.72)  (1.23)  (1.20)  (1.09)  (0.57)       
fueloil_heat 
-0.0971*  0.00475  0.103  0.0230  0.0945       
(-2.28)  (0.04)  (0.64)  (0.15)  (0.51)       
A/C 
0.161***  0.0572*  0.0493  0.0566  0.0445  0.0928*  0.176*** 
(8.00)  (2.21)  (1.61)  (1.71)  (1.15)  (2.63)  (8.61) 
Constant 
1.422**  4.053***  3.861***  4.000***  4.212***  1.510*  1.094 
(2.72)  (7.61)  (6.07)  (5.64)  (4.97)  (2.12)  (1.49) 
effects  city  dwelling  dwelling-
family  dwelling  dwelling-
family  city  city 
R-squared  0.457  0.0557  0.0491  0.0564  0.0481  0.418  0.407 
N.of cases  82905  82905  82905  48027  48027  22003  55688 
std. errs. Clustered  city  dwelling  dwelling  dwelling  dwelling  city  city 
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(A)  (B)  (C)  (D) only one 
utility  
(E) only one 
utility 
(F) electric 
heat  (G) gas heat 
log elec price 
0.150*  0.0376  -0.0334  0.0763  0.0192  0.461  0.128* 
(2.15)  (0.48)  (-0.36)  (0.78)  (0.16)  (1.49)  (2.12) 
log gas price 
-0.693***  -0.565***  -0.577***  -0.583***  -0.587***  -0.634***  -0.693*** 
(-6.57)  (-9.51)  (-8.21)  (-8.31)  (-7.24)  (-4.52)  (-6.45) 
log sq. ft. 
0.189***  0.0524  0.0459  0.0490  0.0439  0.120*  0.201*** 
(9.88)  (1.26)  (0.89)  (1.03)  (0.76)  (2.33)  (10.25) 
House Age 
0.00383***  0.0000321  0.000597  -0.0000686  -0.000542  0.00252  0.00384*** 
(5.87)  (0.01)  (0.15)  (-0.02)  (-0.12)  (1.06)  (5.85) 
Age ^2 
-0.00000911  0.00000684  0.0000168  0.00000619  0.0000201  -0.0000107  -0.00000725 
(-1.30)  (0.22)  (0.42)  (0.16)  (0.42)  (-0.47)  (-1.05) 
Owns the 
Home 
0.0322*  -0.0426  -0.00991  -0.0331  -0.00764  0.00436  0.0412** 
(2.56)  (-1.08)  (-0.14)  (-0.61)  (-0.07)  (0.15)  (3.28) 
No. of 
Rooms 
0.0549***  0.0149**  0.0125  0.0171*  0.0140  0.0695***  0.0536*** 
(18.61)  (2.72)  (1.93)  (2.51)  (1.74)  (7.37)  (17.83) 
No. of Floors 
0.00974  0.0573  0.0485  0.0645  0.0673  -0.0224  0.00998 
(1.18)  (1.75)  (1.09)  (1.72)  (1.32)  (-0.62)  (1.30) 
log Hhold 
Income 
0.00357  0.00285  0.00298  0.00446  0.00313  -0.00950  0.00497* 
(1.61)  (0.60)  (0.55)  (0.74)  (0.47)  (-1.40)  (2.20) 
youngchild 
0.0711***  0.0635**  0.0657*  0.0658*  0.0813*  0.0549***  0.0683*** 
(12.01)  (3.05)  (2.25)  (2.44)  (2.18)  (3.73)  (11.12) 
elderly 
0.0640***  -0.00246  0.00278  -0.00266  -0.000376  0.0574*  0.0659*** 
(7.23)  (-0.10)  (0.08)  (-0.08)  (-0.01)  (2.53)  (7.40) 
lcdd 
-0.00384  -0.0262  -0.00987  -0.0189  0.000143  0.105  0.00162 
(-0.13)  (-0.85)  (-0.28)  (-0.49)  (0.00)  (1.24)  (0.06) 
lhdd 
0.0991  0.105*  0.114  0.192*  0.198*  -0.0936  0.149** 
(1.67)  (1.99)  (1.93)  (2.20)  (2.15)  (-1.15)  (2.83) 
Gas Heat  0.215***  -0.0797  -0.0890  -0.0855  -0.108       
(4.20)  (-0.55)  (-0.48)  (-0.36)  (-0.45)       
Electric Heat  0.0211  -0.225  -0.226  -0.237  -0.229       
(0.47)  (-1.47)  (-1.15)  (-0.95)  (-0.90)       
fueloil_heat  -0.938***  -0.730**  -0.564*  -0.677  -0.506       
(-11.47)  (-2.82)  (-1.99)  (-1.91)  (-1.36)       
A/C 
-0.0147  0.0171  0.00614  -0.000232  -0.0155  -0.0348  -0.0154 
(-0.94)  (0.62)  (0.18)  (-0.01)  (-0.36)  (-1.09)  (-1.01) 
Constant 
0.214  1.931**  1.587*  1.334  1.050  3.746**  0.206 
(0.35)  (2.76)  (1.97)  (1.29)  (0.95)  (2.79)  (0.33) 
effects  city  dwelling  dwelling-
family  dwelling  dwelling-
family  city  city 
R-squared  0.438  0.0497  0.0465  0.0556  0.0512  0.250  0.429 
N.of cases  59492  59492  59492  34371  34371  5176  53027 
std. err 
clustering  city  dwelling  dwelling  dwelling  dwelling  city  city 
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Table 12. Blundell-Bond estimates. Dynamic models. (Model based on dwelling-specific 
effects.) 
  
log of energy usage - lkWh  log of energy usage - lMCF 
   (A) dwelling 
effect  (B) no HVAC  (C) dwelling 
effect  (D) no HVAC 
  
Lag Consumption 
0.0958***  0.0939***  0.116***  0.123*** 
(6.09)  (5.83)  (6.20)  (6.41) 
Log electric price 
-0.736***  -0.743***  -0.0716  -0.0821 
(-12.26)  (-12.29)  (-0.91)  (-1.05) 
Log gas price 
0.265***  0.283***  -0.572***  -0.586*** 
(5.15)  (5.56)  (-9.15)  (-9.32) 
Log sq. ft 
0.142**  0.142**  0.140  0.137 
(2.64)  (2.65)  (1.91)  (1.83) 
House age 
-0.00624*  -0.00699*  0.00691*  0.00720* 
(-2.04)  (-2.22)  (2.22)  (2.31) 
Age ^ 2 
0.0000497  0.0000522  -0.0000353  -0.0000365 
(1.63)  (1.68)  (-1.07)  (-1.11) 
Owns the Home 
-0.0261  -0.0310  -0.0168  -0.0101 
(-0.90)  (-1.06)  (-0.45)  (-0.27) 
No. Rooms 
0.0128***  0.0126***  0.0162***  0.0162*** 
(3.70)  (3.60)  (3.72)  (3.70) 
No. Floors 
0.00976  -0.00316  0.149***  0.164*** 
(0.45)  (-0.14)  (4.98)  (5.40) 
Log Hhold Income 
0.00935**  0.00925**  0.00318  0.00425 
(3.09)  (3.05)  (0.93)  (1.23) 
Youngchild 
0.0725***  0.0714***  0.0574**  0.0578** 
(4.89)  (4.80)  (3.01)  (2.99) 
Elderly 
-0.00728  -0.00829  0.0160  0.0190 
(-0.36)  (-0.41)  (0.69)  (0.81) 
log CDD 
0.0660**  0.0793***  -0.0297  -0.0304 
(3.01)  (3.56)  (-1.21)  (-1.22) 
log HDD 
0.0222  0.00478  0.200***  0.202*** 
(0.95)  (0.21)  (5.46)  (5.41) 
              
Constant 
2.389***  2.422***  -0.661  -0.844 
(4.06)  (4.08)  (-0.91)  (-1.14) 
N.of cases  24487  24487  17679  17679 
              













                                                
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The price elasticity of residential energy demand is an important input into assessments 
of the effects of energy policies and demand forecasts. In this paper, we have focused on the 
residential demand for electricity and gas, working with nationwide household-level data and 
covering recent years, namely 1997-2007.  
There are reasons to suspect that earlier estimates based on a similar approach but old 
data may no longer apply because of well-documented recent trends towards larger homes, more 
efficient but more numerous appliances, and more extensive use of air conditioning, which 
drives up energy consumption during the summer (EIA, 2010).  
With more recent estimates based on abrupt changes in prices due to supply conditions 
in geographically limited areas, it is unclear whether they are appropriate nationwide. Matters 
are further complicated by the deregulation of the utilities sector and expectations about future 
price changes.  
To address these external validity limitations, we assembled a mixed panel/multi-year 
cross-sectional dataset of households in the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the United States as 
of 2008. Our dataset documents utility bills, heating and cooling systems and appliances, and 
dwelling and household characteristics for over 69,000 dwellings (over 74,000 households) 
from 1997 to 2007, for a total of over 98,000 observations. These data are taken from the 
American Housing Survey. We merged this dataset with utility prices and heating and cooling 
degree-days at the metro area level. To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive set of 
data for examining household residential energy usage at the national level, containing the 
broadest geographical coverage, and with the longest longitudinal component (max T=6).  40 
 
                                                
Another important feature of our data is that we can control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in a variety of ways. City-specific fixed effects exploit the variation in prices, 
dwelling characteristics, and state and local policies between observations, while dwelling-
specific and dwelling-household effects rely on variation of prices, weather, and other local 
characteristics over time. We estimate static and dynamic models under alternate assumptions 
about the difficulty of reversing a home’s heating and cooling system.   
We find strong household response to energy prices, both in the short and long term. 
From the static models, we get estimates of the own price elasticity of electricity demand in the -
0.860 to -0.667 range, while the own price elasticity of gas demand is -0.693 to -0.566. Contrary 
to earlier literature (Metcalf and Hassett, 1999; Reiss and White, 2005), we find no evidence of 
significantly different elasticities across households with electric and gas heat.  The dynamic 
models produce estimates similar estimates, with short-run (long-run) own-price elasticity of 
demand of -0.736 (-0.814) for electricity and -0.572 (-0.647) for gas.  
These results are in sharp contrast with much of the literature on residential energy 
consumption in the United States, and with the figures used in current government agency 
practice. In its Annual Energy Outlook, for example, the Energy Information Agency (EIA) 
historically employed a short-term price elasticity of -0.15 for non-electric energy. In their 2010 
report, EIA adopts an electric elasticity of -0.30 in anticipation of improved consumer 
awareness resulting from recent smart grid projects.
26
                                                 
26 The text refers specifically to smart grid projects funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009  
 Our results suggest that price elasticities 
are likely more pronounced than that. Moreover, they suggest that there might be considerable 
potential for policies which affect energy price than may have been previously appreciated. We 
leave it to future research to explore how people respond to changing energy prices—through 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/assumption/residential.html and EIA (2010) 41 
 
                                                
energy efficiency investments, changing the stock of appliances, or merely changing 
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